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RECENT CASES
AGENcY-LAB

rY OF AGENT FOR "ADVANCES" BY P iNCrPAL-The plain-

tiff brought action "against his former agent for moneys advanced to him in
excess of commissions earned by the agent while selling plaintiff's product
upon commission. The plaintiff could not prove an express agreement on the
agent's part to repay such advances. Held, that the agent is not personally
liable in absence of an express agreement on his part to make such repayment.
Shaler Umbrella Co. v. Blow, 227 N. W. i (Wis., 1929).
The situation presented by the instant case has resulted in conflicting
decisions.' In a number of cases, it has been held that under such circumstances, when advances are made in excess of commissions earned, an agreement to repay such excess will be implied.' Others are in accord with the
principal case.3 The parties apparently did not anticipate earnings falling
below the amount of the advances and consequently made no express provision
for the contingency. The problem then seems to be one of construction. The
cases seem to base their decisions on the construction of the word "advance."
Thus one court, holding no liability, said that to advance is to forward, but
for what purposes must be elsewhere ascertained.4 Another court said, that
an advance is something which precedes, but which no more creates a debt
than would an advancement made by a father to a son in anticipation of the
expected inheritance by the latter.5 Courts adopting the opposite view have
decided that since the actual contingency is not provided for, they will scrutinize
the facts to determine what the parties intended 0 So, one court said that to
advance money is to pay before it is due, implying that the parties look forward
to the time when the money will be due the recipient and therefore if the money
'In practically all of these cases, such advances were to be applied against,
or deducted from, the employee's earnings.
'Strauss v. Cohen Bros. Co., x69 Ill. App. 337 (1912) ; Clark v. Eastern
Advertiser Co., io6 Me. 59, 75 At. 303 (igo9); Snellenburg Clothing Co. v.
Levitt, 282 Pa. 65, 127 Atl. 309 (925).
IArbaugh v. Shockney, 34 Ind. App. 268, 71 N. E. 232 (1904); Luce v.
Consolidated Ubero Plantation Co., 195 Mass. 84, 8o N. E. 793 (i9o7); Roofing
Sales Co. v. Rose, zo3 N. J. L. 553, 137 Atl. 211 (1927) ; North Western
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney, ioS N. Y. 118, I5N. E. 303 (1888).
'North Western Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Mooney, supra note 3 at 124,
... nor does it necessarily imply a loan."
Arbaugh v. Shockney, rapra note 3 at 275; "To allow recovery by the
employer would be to insert in the contract a provision to which the parties
never agreed", Roofing Sales Co. v. Rose, supra note 3.
! Sneilenburg Clothing Co. v. Levitt, supra note 2 at 68, . . . "even
though designated as salary on the employer's books .

.

..

nevertheless

there was no suggestion of a salary in the contract and therefore compensation
was to be measured entirely by commissions earned."
(777)
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never becoms due, then the recipient is under an obligation to repay it.7 With
all these decisions before it, the court in the principal case presents two additional reasons for its decision. First, that the purpose is to discover the intent
of the parties and since the employer could easily have provided for repayment
then his failure to do so is fatal.' Secondly, that the agreement i§ in the nature
of a joint adventure from which both the employer and agent hope to profit
and to hold the agent liable for advances in excess of commissions earned
would be placing the entire risk of the enterprise on the agent. As for the
first reason, it can easily be seen that since we are trying to determine the
intent of the parties, the contract not being clear, the fact that a certain contingency was not provided for is no reason for saying that the parties did not
intend a certain result, since it is the fact that this contingency was not expressly provided for which necessitates a construing of the intent of the parties.
Secondly, calling the arrangement a joint adventure seems to be begging the
question, because the determination as to whether there is a joint adventure is
governed by the determination of just what is the agreement of the parties.
Also, if treated as a joint adventure the same reason of the court can be used
to defeat its own conclusion, since, if we do not hold the agent liable for the
excess in advances, then the whole burden of the adventure is on the employer.
As a matter of construction then, it seems more logical to decide that the purpose of an advance to an agent is to give him a start with a view to repayment,
either by earning the amount in commissions or by remunerating the employer
for the difference between money advanced and commissions earned.

CONDITIONAL

SALEs-PossEssIoN

RETAIEN BY VENDEE FOR REPAIs-The

defendant sold to the plaintiff an automobile on a conditional sales contract.
The automobile was damaged in an accident and was delivered to the vendor
by the vendee to be repaired. The vendor then gave the vendee notice that,
since there was a default in payment, he would sell the automobile and apply
the proceeds to the purchase price, to which the vendee never expressly agreed.
The vendor then gave notice of the sale as provided by statute 1 and sold the
automobile. The vendee then brought an action to recover the amount paid by
him on the automobile. Held, that since the vendee had not retaken possession
because of default in payments, he was a bailee and was guilty of conversion in
selling the automobile and was therefore liable to the vendee for the payments
made by the vendee.

(2d)

Murray v. Federal Motor Truck Sales Corp.,

22 S.

W.

(Tenn. 1929).
As a general rule, in a conditional sale the vendor may recover from the
vendee either the possession or the value of the property sold, if the vendee is
227

I Strauss v. Cohen Bros. Co., supra note 2. .
. "an undertaking to
make8 advances is not equivalent to an obligation to pay salary absolutely."
Shaler Umbrella Co. v. Blow, 227 N. W. I (Wise., 1929) at 2.
9
1

1bid at I.
TEN.

ANN. CODE (Shannon, 1917) § 3666.
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in default and if the vendor has not waived his right.2 In such circumstances
possession may be retaken by the vendor without resort to the courts and without the consent of the vendee' so long as the vendor does not exercise his right
unreasonably, as by using force.' In the principal case the vendor regained
possession of the property with the consent of the vendee and it is difficult to
see why, since there was a default in the payments, the vendor could not assert
his right to the property under the contract at once, without returning it to the
vendee and then resuming possession. This is so especially in the light of
decisions to the effect that the vendor may retairi possession of the property
given to him by the vendee to be repaired, where there has been a default in
the payments 5 Where there is a statute, however, regulating the rights of
the parties under a conditional sale, its provisions must be strictly adhered to.'
In the instant case the provisions of the statute had been complied with, but
the statute provided that the rights and duties arise where the seller has "regained possession of said property because of the consideration remaining
unpaid at maturity." Since, here, the vendor had regained possession of the
property to repair it and not because of the default, the court held that the
vendor could not exercise the rights that he would ordinarily have. It would
seem, however, that inasmuch as there was a default and the vendor had regained possession without the use of force and since he had complied with
the provisions of the statute,7 he should not be denied his rights simply because
his possession, to which he was rightfully entitled, was originally gained for
a reason other than that there had been a default. This rule would seem
particularly logical in the light of the decisions to the effect that trickery may
be employed by the vendor to regain the possession from the vendee 5
'Flaherty v. Ginsberg, 135 Iowa 743, I1 N. W. IO50 (907); Seanor v.
McLaughlin, 165 Pa. 150, 3o Ad. 717 (1895) ; see Trisch v. Wells, 2oo Mass.
429, 86 N. E. 975 (igog).
'Ramey v. Kimball Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 597, 58 S. W. 471 (igoo) (where
a piano was removed while the vendees were not at home) ; North v. Williams,
120 Pa. 109, 13 AtI. 723 (1888) (where the vendor's agent came for the piano
and gained entrance by saying he wished to tune it).
'Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Phipps, 49 Ind. App. ir6, 94 N. E. 793
(1911) (vendee sat on the machine to prevent its removal and vendor's agent
tipped it over causing vendee to fall off resulting in a miscarriage) ; Drury v.
Hervey, 126 Mass. 519 (I879).

'Alexander v. Mobile Auto. Co., 2oo Ala. 586, 76 So. 944 (1917) (holding
that where the act of the vendor in retaining possession after making repairs
was equivocal, it would be construed to be an exercise of his right under the
superior title rather than under his lien for repairs) ; Henderson v. Mahoney,
31 Tex. Civ. App. 539, 72 S. W. 1019 (1903); Chase v. Kelly, 125 Minn. 317,
320, 146 N. W. 1113, 1114 (1914): "after her (vendee's) default, she could

by no legal means have deprived plaintiff of possession unless she first paid or
performed according to the terms of her contract."
'Lee v. Gorham, 165 Mass. 130, 42 N. E. 556 (1896); Smith v. Wood, 63
Vt. 534, 22 Atl. 575 (i8gi); Massilon Thresher Co. v. Wilker, 82 S. W. 316
(Tenn. 1904); Whitelaw Furniture Co. v. Boon, IO2 Tenn. 719, 52 S. W.

155 (1899).
'Supra note r.
'North v. Williams, -supranote 4.
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WoMEN-A married woman,
CONFL CT os LAWS-DoMIciLE OF M mARR
entering the United States from abroad, claimed exemption from the customs
duty on apparel, on the ground that she was domiciled in France. Evidence
showed that her husband was domiciled in this country, but that by mutual
agreement, she had always maintained a separate residence in France, as her
permanent home. Held, that she had thereby acquired a separate domicile and
was exempt from the duty. Ganna Walska McCormick v. U. S., IV U. S.
Daily 3209 (1930).
The result reached in the principal case is opposed to the strict common
law view,' to which England still clings,' that the domicile of the wife follows
that of her husband no matter where she actually resides. This rule is based
on the legal fiction of the identify of husband and wife and on the duty of the
wife to dwell with her husband.' The principal case expresses the more liberal
attitude of the American courts, which early made an exception to the common
law rule, to the effect that a married woman may acquire a separate domicile
ior the purpose of suing for divorce. The courts were led to make this exception by a desire to avoid the hardship that would otherwise result in cases
where the misconduct of the husband had made the separation necessary. The
argument was that, inasmuch as the reason for the rule was the promotion of
the unity of interest between husband and wife, once this unity was destroyed
and adverse interests created, the reason for the rule no longer existed and
the rule was no longer applicable. Moreover, the misconduct of the husband
operated as constructive consent to the acquisition by the wife of a separate
domicile and as a discharge of her duty to dwell with him.' A few cases went
'Warrender

v. Warrender,

2

Cl. & F. 488 (Eng. 1834); Yelverton v.
MARRIAGE & DIVORCE

Yelverton, i Sw. & Tra. 574 (Eng. 1859); 2 BisHo,
(4th ed.) .§ 129; SToRy, CoNFLiCT oF LAWS § 46.

' The common law view is adhered to as strictly as ever as seen in the
cases of Alberta v. Cook, [1926] i A. C. 444; (1926) 40 HA v. L. REv. 134135; and in H. v. H. [1928] 2 P. 2o6, which remove any suspicion of a departure from the old rule that may have been aroused by dicta in Armytage v.
Armytage [1898] P. 178, 185; Ogden v. Ogden [I9O8] P. 46, 78; Dolphin v.
Robbins, 7 H. L. Chs. 390, 418 (1859) ; and Lord Advocate v. Jaffery EI92I]
A. C. 146, 16o.
'BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES, § 442; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
(1927) § 30. In Harteau v. Harteau, 14 Pick. 181 (Mass. 1833) the court
says at p. 185: ". . . The maxim is founded upon the theoretic identity of

person and of interest between husband and wife as established by law, and
the presumption that from the nature of that relation, the home of the one is
that of the other and intended to promote, strengthen and secure their interests
in this relation, as it ordinarily exists where union and harmony prevail."
'Harteau v. Harteau, supra note 3. The court continues at p. 185:
. . . But the law will recognize the wife as having a separate existence,
and separate interests, and separate rights in those cases where the express
object of all proceedings is to show that the relation itself ought to be dissolved;" Shaw v. Shaw, 94 Mass. 158 (1867); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R. I. 87
(1856) ; Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155, 21 Sup. Ct. 544 (1899) ; Haddock
v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562 (igo6). In Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (U. S.
1869), the court says at p. 124: "The rule is that she may acquire a separate
domicile whenever it is necessary or proper that she do so. The right springs
from the necessity for its exercise, and endures as long as the necessity continues."
5In re Geiser's Will, 82 N. J. Eq. 311, 87 Atl. 628 (1913).
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further and held that such separate domicile, once acquired for the purpose
of divorce, is acquired for any other purpose.' The majority of cases, however, are cases of suit by the wife ,for divorce and seem, in their dicta, to confine the exception to such suits only.7 The principal case is to be distinguished
from these cases and falls rather in the class of cases which allow a separate
domicile by reason of the actual consent of the husband,8 in contradistinction
to his constructive "consent arising out of the fact of his misconduct. This
latter class of cases agrees in giving effect to such consent. In reaching this
result, they are consistent with the reasoning of the cases of constructive
consent, ,for in all of them the unity, which the strict common law rule seeks to
promote; is non-existent,' and the rule therefore seems properly held inapplicable.
The principal case, however, goes a step further than any of these in that it
lacks the essential fact o~f a cessation of friendly relations and of the unity
of interests. ° The result is, nevertheless, thoroughly in accord with the dicta
in earlier cases,' and even more, with the modem tendency toward complete
emancipation of women, which it helps decidedly to confirm.

CONFLICT OF LAws-INTESTATE SUCCESSION OF PERSONALTY-RETALiATION
DEcE By DomlciuARY STAT-C died domiciled in Italy, leaving personal property in New Jersey consisting of a contract for royalties. All interested parties were domiciled in Italy and a family settlement by them was
confirmed by the Italian court, giving G, C's infant daughter, one-half of C's
estate. A New Jersey statute' provided that two-thirds of the property of
(3ordon v. Yost, 14o Fed. 79 (195o)
(alienation of affections); Watertown v. Greaves, iI2 Fed. 183 (1901) (tort action); Williamson v. Osenton,
232 U. S. 61g (914)

182 S. W. 124

(915)

(damage suit); McKay v. McKay, 192 Mo. App. 22,

(alienation of affections); Buchholtz v. Buchholtz, 63

Wash. 213, 115 Pac. 88 (1911) (letters of administration) ; Shute v. Sargent,
67 N. H. 305, 36 At. 282 (1892) (distribution of estate).

Cases cited supra note 4.
That consent of the husband should prevent the application of the strict
common law rule is consistent with the explanation of that rule as given in
8

STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 46 where he says: "A married woman follows

the domicile of her husband. This results from the general principle that a
person who is under the power and authority of another, possesses no right to
choose a domicile."
' In these cases there is an actual permanent separation, the husband gives
no support to the wife and there is no longer any community of interest between the two, Matter of Florence, 54 Hun. 328, 9 N. Y. Supp. 578 (1889) ;
Chapman v. Chapman, 129 Ill. 386, 21 N. E. 8o6 (1889). That the absence
of unity of the marriage state is a vital factor in deciding whether a separate
domicile has been acquired, rather than the mere fact that they have separate
residences by mutual agreement, is brought out in Estate v. Wiches, 128 Cal.
27o, 6o Pac. 867 (I9OO), where the husband and wife had separate residences
but the wife was held to have the domicile of the husband because the unity
of the marriage state had been maintained.
"In the principal case, husband and wife merely separated as a matter of
convenience,
but they retained their community of interests.
1
Sutpra note 5.
12 N. J. Com,!P. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1925)

§§ 146-i69, p. 2628.
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"any person who shall die intestate" shall descend to his surviving issue. In
preliminary decrees,2 the New Jersey court decided that the property was to be
distributed according to the New Jersey method of distribution, whereby G
would receive two-thirds. The Italian court then issued a retaliation decree
threatening to redistribute the estate so as eventually to give G only one-half,
if New Jersey refused to yield to its disposition, and also asserting that it
would not recognize as a discharge any payments made by the obligor under
the New Jersey order. The lower New Jersey court refused to yield,' despite
the Italian decree. Held, that G was entitled to only one-half the property, in
accordance with the Italian decree. Caruso v. Caruso, Ct. of Errors and Appeals, N. J., Feb. 3, 1930.
At common law, upon the death of the owner intestate, personal property
descends according to the law of the domicile of the decedent at the time of
his death." Since the property is within its borders, the state of the situs really
controls the property and may thus, by statute, abrogate the common law rule.'
In the absence of such a statute, the law of the situs, in order to pass all the
property conveniently as one estate, includes its conflict of laws rule that the
domiciliary plan of devolution shall prevail! Where obnoxious to some well
founded domestic policy, however, the common law rule will be rejected.'
There appearing no such policy in the Caruso case, the lower court was seemingly striking out against the great current of judicial decision. Moreover,
the words "any person" in the statute have generally been construed by courts
in similar situations to mean "any resident." 6 While it has been urged " that
the court o~f the situs should not be swayed by intimidation of the domiciliary
state, it would seem that the former could remain thus impervious only so long
as the threat issued from a state which can be brought within the discipline of
the "full faith and credit" clause of the United States Constitution. The fact
that the New Jersey court would have been unable to protect the debtors of
the estate from being compelled to pay again by the Italian court furnishes
a potent, although perhaps hitherto unconsidered, reason for adhering to the
rule of convenience.
1I39 Atl. 812 (N. J. Ch. 1928) ; 141 Atl. i6 (N. J. Ch. 1928).
At]. 771 (N. J. Ch. Ib28).
14 How. 400 (U. S. 1852); Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21
Conn. 577 (1852); Colvin v. Jones, 194 Mich. 67o, i6i N. W. 847 (917).
2143

'Ennis v. Smith,

The common law rule has also received statutory sanction, Pa.:

2

Purdon's

Digest (:3th ed.) p. 2oo4, par. 50.
5
Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) § 1380; ILT_ Rxv. STAT. (Cahill,
1927) c. 39, § i; cf. In re Barton's Est., 196 Cal. 508, 238 Pac. 68i (925).
Cf. also, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Crenshaw, 12o Tenn. 6o6, no S. W. 1017

(igo8) (tax imposed by state of situs) ; Frick v. Pa. 268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct.
603 (1925) (attempt to tax by domiciliary state).
' GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1927) 368 seq.
7 Succession of Petit, 49 La. Ann. 625, 21 So. 717 (1897); see Lee v.
Belknap, 163 Ky. 418, 173 S. W. 1129 (1915).
'Lee v. Belknap, ibid.
See (I929) 42 H.xv. L. Ray. 827.
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CONTRAcS--ANTICirAToRY

BREAcH-BEACH

TAKES

PLACr

WHmE

Noncs Is Posra--In 192o plaintiff, an Ohio corporation, contracted to sell
goods to defendant, a Kansas corporation, shipment to be made monthly in
equal quantities over a period of a year, with a provision that each month's
requirement should be considered a separate contract. After performance for
ten months a controversy arose and defendant mailed a letter at Kansas City
definitely repudiating the contract. Plaintiff treated this repudiation as a
breach and over five years later sued thereon for damages. Held, that the
breach occurred where the letter of repudiation was mailed, therefore the
Kansas five year Statute of Limitations constituted a bar to the action.
Auglaze Box Board Co. v. Kansas City Fibre Box Co., 35 F. (2d) 822 (C. C.
A. 6th, 1929).

Under the general rule, upon repudiation of an executory agreement by
one party, the other party has the choice of treating such action as a breach
and commencing suit for damages, or of keeping the contract open as subsisting and effective.' In order that the wronged party may actually have
such an option, it would seem to be essential that he know of the repudiation,
so that he may govern his course accordingly and indicate which alternative
he has selected. The court in the principal case has applied the Adams v.
Lindsell2 theory that is generally followed in the case of acceptance of an
offer.8 That doctrine that the acceptance is made when and where it is posted
has frequently been criticized as illogical," but it is adhered to on the ground
that it is justified by business convenience. In the situation before the court,
there is no such question of practicability involved, hence no justification for
extending the "acceptance" doctrine.' An underlying reason for permitting
a wronged party to treat a repudiation as an anticipatory breach is to make
him take some action to mitigate the damages. Were a letter o.f repudiation
lost, it would often be impossible for the wronged party to make his choice
in time to mitigate the damages before the time of performance. Since the
'Zuck v. McClure, 98 Pa. 541 (1881); 3 WI.IsroN, CONTRACTS (1920)
RFSTATEmENT (Am. L. Inst. 1929) § 275 (I).
21 Barn. & Aid. 681 (Eng. 1818).

§ 1296 et seq.; CoNTRAcTs,

'Wester v. Casein Co., 206 N. Y. 506, :oo N. E. 488 (1912) was the only
American case cited by the court as authority for its holding. In that case the
plaintiff in Argentine cabled a request to defendant in New York to inform
plaintiff as to what defendant contemplated doing. Defendant cabled a repudiation. The New York Court of Appeals took jurisdiction on the ground that
the breach occurred where the repudiation was cabled, but the court did so by
reasoning that delivery to the cable company was a delivery to the plaintiff's
agent. This case is criticized, (1913) 61 U. OF PA. L. REV. 413. Glynn v.
Hyde-Murphy, 113 Misc. 329, 184 N. Y. Supp. 462 (192o) a later New York

case held that where defendant in Pennsylvania mailed letter of repudiation
to plaintiff in New York, the New York court had jurisdiction on the ground
that it was necessary in order to constitute a breach, that plaintiff get notice;
hence the cause of action arose in New York. It is interesting to note that in
both cases the local court .found that it had jurisdiction.
' For an interesting discussion of the illogical possibilities of the rule, see
Merlin's argument in Sv. F---, as reported in CosTiGAN, CASES ON COXTRACTS (1921)

99.

5The general tendency to decrease the time of running of statutes of
limitations may have had some effect on the decision in the principal case.
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Adams v. Lindsell rule is a forced legal conception, the application of which
has never been accepted with regard to revocation or rejection of an offer and
has not the necessary justification under the circumstances of the instant case,
it is submitted that the breach should not have been deemed to take place until
the promisee treated the letter as a breach; likewise, that the breach could not
have occurred but at the place where the promisee took such action.'

COPYRIGHT-LIABIUTY OF AMUSEMENT ENTERPRISE OPERATOR FOR INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT MUSIC BY INDEPENDENT CONTRAToR-The copy-

right owners sued defendants, operators of a dance hall to which admission
was charged, for performance of copyrighted music by an orchestra without
permission of plaintiffs. Defendants dispute liability on the ground that they
had no control over the players or the selections to be rendered, and that the
contract was made with the orchestra leader as an independent contractor, for
whose torts they were not liable. Held, that this defense was not available.
Dreamland Ball Room v. Shapiro, Bentstein & Co., 36 F. (2d) 354 (C. C. A.
7th, 1929).
Under the provisions of the Copyright Act of igop,' the owner of a copyright on a musical composition possesses the exclusive right of publicly performing it for profit. Public performance for profit has been construed by
the courts to include not only public performances for which admission has
been charged,' but also performances in a restaurant without charge for admission' and broadcasts from a radio station operated by the defendant for
the purpose of stimulating his business.' A performance at a public dance
hall, as in the principal case, is clearly a public performance within the meaning
of the Act;' and since the music is the main inducement to pay the admission
fee,6 the playing of musical compositions is for the profit of the owner of the
enterprise. Since no intent is necessary to an infringement of a copyright," if
the performance is not authorized by the copyright owner, its use constitutes
an infringement if used in a public performance for profit, even if the defendant is not aware that a copyright exists or if he delegates the selection
of compositions to an independent contracior.! The mere fact that the de'Wmust-oN, op. cit. supra note I, § 1332 criticizes Wester v. Casein Co.,
supra note 4, saying of the case that it ". . . . cannot be accepted". But see
ANSON, CONTRAcTs (Corbin's ed. 1924) 461, footnote I; 6 PAGE, CONTAcTs
(2d ed. 1922) § 3578.
135 STAT. 1075 (I909), 17 U. S. C. § I (e) (1926).
'Witmark v. Pastime Amusement Co., 298 Fed. 470 (E. D. S. C. 1924),
aff'd 2 F. (2d) io2o (C. C. A. 4th, 1924).
'Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U. S. 591, 37 Sup. Ct. 232 (I917).
'Witmark v. L. Bamberger & Co., 291 Fed. 776 (D. C. N. J. 1923);
(1924) 72 U. OF PA. L. REv. 190.
'Irving Berlin v. Daigle, 31 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
Irving Berlin v. Daigle, ibd.
7
Altman v. New Haven Union Co., 254 Fed. n3 (D. C. Conn. i9i8);
Fisher
8 v. Dillingham, 298 Fed. i45 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
Harms v. Cohen, 279 Fed. 276 (E. D. Pa. 1922); see Witmark v.
Pastime Amusement Co., supra note 2.
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fendant operates for profit establishes his liability for permitting or authorizing
the unlicensed use of a copyrighted musical composition on the premises.?
Since liability rests upon the interference with the plaintiffs exclusive right
and not upon the defendant's intent, the decision in the principal case seems a
correct application of the Copyright Act.

DEREcOvERALE-Request, on appeal, for an increase in
damages for injuries resulting from bites inflicted by defendant's dog. Held,
that the financial status of defendant should be considered in arriving at the
DAMAGES-CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S FINANCIAL CONDITION IN

TERMINING AMOUNT

amount of recovery.

Perez-Sandi v. Berges,

125

So. I85 (La.

1929).

Though a consideration of the defendant's pecuniary condition may be
correctly held admissible in the determination of compensatory damages under
a liberal construction of the Louisiana Civil Code,' and though supported by
prior decisions of that state,2 such would seem contra to the basic principle o.f
such damages. By the very nature of compensatory damages, their purpose is
to award the approximate monetary equivalent of the injury suffered,' and it
is difficult to find any reasonable connection between the extent of the injury
and the defendant's ability to compensate therefor. Where the damages are
of an exemplary or punitive nature, a different purpose is in view and a
different problem presents itself. The extent of the punishment that will be
inflicted by such damages is in direct ratio to the wealth of the party compelled
to pay, and in such instances a knowledge by the jury of the defendant's
financial status is essential to a determination of the proper amount, and such
seems to be the universal rule.4 A similar situation presents itself where the
degree of the injury suffered is to some extent dependent on the wealth of
the defendant, as in cases of libel where the affluence o~f the party at fault is
"Irving Berlin v. Daigle, 26 F. (2d) 149 (E. D. La. 1928), reversed on
other grounds, 31 F. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929). Receipt of rent by a
lessor of the premises is too remote to be considered profit derived from a
public performance. Fromont v. Aeolian Co., 254 Fed. 592 (S. D. N. Y. I918).
'LA. REv. Cirv. CoDE (Saunders 2d ed. 192o) art. 1934, § 3: "In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases of offenses, quasi-offenses,
and quasi contracts, much discretion must be left to the judge or jury, while in
other cases they have none."
'Daly v. Kiel, io6 La. 170, 30 So. 254 (Igoi) ; Jackson v. Briede, 156 La.
573, ZOO So. 722 (1924).
8 I SUTHERLAND, DAMAGES (4 th ed. 1916) § I2: "The universal and cardinal
principle is that the person injured shall receive a compensation commensurate
with his loss or injury, and no more; and it is a right of the person who is
bound to pay this compensation not to be compelled to pay more
'Marriott v. Williams, i52 Cal. 705, 710, 93 Pac. 875, 877 (I9o8): "The
complainant alleged malice on the part of the defendants and asked exemplary
damages. It was therefore proper to allow evidence of the defendants' wealth.
Such evidence is admitted to enable the jury to determine what amount of
punishment would be inflicted upon the defendant by compelling him to pay
a given sum of money." Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Ill. 192, 13x N. E. 675
(ig2i) ; Aubibert v. Michaud, iig Me. 295, 111 Atl. 305 (1920); Matheis v.
Mazet, 164 Pa. 58o, 30 AtI. 434 (1894); White v. White, 140 Wis. 538, 122
S. W. io5I (19o9); I SEDGWIcK, DAMAGES (gth ed. 1912) § 385.
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held to be indicative of the influence that his statements would carry. Obviously the basis of neither of the above rules applies to the determination of
compensatory damages, and in most jurisdictions evidence of the wealth of the
defendant is inadmissible.5 If it is not a proper consideration for the jury,
there is no valid reason why an appellate court should be influenced thereby,
as the principle remains the same. An award of damages beyond the power
of the defendant to pay may seem an ineffectual attempt at justice, and hence
an investigation of the defendant's resources might suggest itself as a proper
expedient. However, such a view is open to the objection that the defendant's
ability to meet the damages awarded is determinable only at the time that the
judgment is executed. Since the judgment creditor, by proper procedure, can
delay execution till a propitious time, it would seem unjust to limit his recovery, where the injury warranted a greater one, by any consideration of the
defendant's financial situation at the time that the judgment is given.

EQUITY-POwER To RESTRAIN ACTIONS AT LAW IN FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS

-Defendant is resident of Erie, Pa.,
Defendant brought suit in Buffalo, N.
caused by plaintiff in Erie. Plaintiff
fendant from prosecuting his claim in

and plaintiff operates railroad therein.
Y., to recover for injuries negligently
seeks to enjoin, in Erie court, the deBuffalo, alleging that it will be unduly

prejudiced and embarrassed by such foreign suit, and that the defendant will

be inequitably benefited thereby. Held, that the injunction should issue. N. Y.
Central Rr. Co. v. Marz, (Ct. of Common Pleas, Erie Co.) reported in Philadelphia Legal Intelligencer, Jan. io, I93o, p. 35.

Equity, ever since the famous struggle for supremacy between Chief
Justice Coke and Chancellor Ellesmere in the 17th century,' has maintained
an unquestioned power to restrain actions at law, where the prosecution of the
suit, in the particular court, or at the particular time or place, would not do
substantial justice 2 Equity will intervene, therefore, if some special defense
recognized only by equity is involved,' if the legal remedy is inadequate,' to
'Note (885) 67 AM. DEc. 562.
'Laidlaw v. Sage, 158 N. Y. 73, 103, 52 N. E. 679, 69o (I899) : "Evidence
of the wealth of a party is never admissible, directly or otherwise, unless in
those exceptional cases where position or wealth is necessarily involved in
determining the damages sustained"; Story v. Green, 164 Cal. 768, 130 Pac.
870 (913); Jones & Adams Co. v. George, 227 I1. 64, 81 N. E. 4 (1907) ;
Allard v. La Plain, 125 Me. 44, 13o Ad. 737 (1925); 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE
(i6th ed. 1899) § 269.
1I

SPENCE,

EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE

(z846)

675;

MEDLEY,

MANUAL

OF

ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (5th ed. 1913) 411, quoted in COOK, CASES

ON EQUITY (one vol. ed. 1926) 64.

24 POMEROY, EQ. JuR. (4th ed. I919) § 136o; 2 STORY, EQ. JUR. (14 ed.
1918) § 1194.
3
County of Armstrong v. Brinton, 47 Pa. 367 (1864) ; Aimee Realty Co.
v. Hailer, 128 Mo. App. 66, io6 S. W. 588 (907) ; Ordway v. Farrow, 79 Vt.
192, 64 Atl. I16 (I9o7).
"Gallagher v. Fayette Co. Rr., 38 Pa. IO2 (i86o) ; Van Winkle v. Curtis,
3 N. J. Eq. 422 (1852) ; Brady v. Carteret Realty Co., 7o N. J. Eq. 748, 64 Atl.

io78 (igo6).
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prevent multiplicity of suits,' and to aid discovery
Well recognized exceptions to the rule are, that federal courts may not, except in the specific instances
stated in the federal law on bankruptcy, restrain actions in state courts, that
the latter may not stay actions in federal courts, and that a court of equity
may not, in general, enjoin an action in a criminal court 9 or in another equity
court.2 Since this jurisdiction is said to be exercised it personam to prevent
the plaintiff from taking an unconscionable advantage of his position, but not
to control the court of law," it follows that equity may restrain lawsuits even
&
in foreign courts' if the parties thereto are locally found and served.
'
The
basis of this jurisdiction is that the foreign tribunal, under certain circumstances, cannot render as complete justice as the domestic court.'
In the instant case, plaintiff required thirteen witnesses, seven of whom, not being
employees of the railroad, could not be compelled to attend the foreign suit.
Nor would depositions be satisfactory, since the vagueness of the defendant's
allegations of injury made it impossible to anticipate the requisite medical
testimony. Since the defendant, who was in court, offered no valid reason for
subjecting the plaintiff to the inconvenience and detriment of the foreign suit,
the decision of the court, enjoining the action, seems eminently proper and
desirable. But it is submitted that equity's time-hallowed practice of insisting
that it merely acts in personam to restrain unconscionable advantage but does
not presume to direct the foreign court of law, conceals, through evasive
phraseology, the tendency of equity to claim supremacy over an older and
inferior system of jurisprudefice. It is the very purpose of such jurisdiction
as this to restrain the proceedings of the foreign court, and the fact that it
effectuates this end indirectly through the parties changes neither the character
nor the purpose of the jurisdiction.

'Woods v. Monroe, V7 Mich. 238 (1868); Lea v. Nielson, 83 Minn. ioi,
82 N. W. iio4 (igoi) ; Paterson Rr. v. Jersey City, 9 N. J. Eq. 434 (1852).
'Waterlow v. Bacon, L. R. 2 Eq. 514 (1866); Hubbard v. Eastman, 47
N. H. 5o7 (1867) ; Sperry v. Gibson, 3 W. Va. 522 (1868).
"Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22, § 5, 28 U. S. C. § 378 (1926) : "the writ of
injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a state except in cases where such injunction may be
authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." Dial v. Reynolds,
96 U. S. 340 (1877); Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158 (0884).
I Smith v. Reed, 74 N. J. Eq. 776, 7o Atl. 96 (I9o8) ; Henderson v. Hendrie,
61 W. Va. 183, 56 S. E. 369 (19o7).
'E parte Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200 (1888) ; Kelly v. Connor, 122 Tenn. 339,
123 S. W. 622 (x9o8).
"2Wolfe v. Titus, 124 Cal. 264, 56 Pac. io42. (1899); Corbin v. Casina
Land Co., 26 App. Div. 408, 49 N. Y. Supp. 929 (1828) ; Endter v. Lennon, 46
Wis. 299, 5o N. W. 194 (1879).
"5 Po FloY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2058; 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 2,
§ 1195.
'CLARK,
EQUITY (1919) § 13; Sweeny v. Hunter, 145 Pa. 363, 22 Atl.
653 (1891); Miller v. Gittings, 85 Md. 6oI, 37 AtI. 372 (1897); Hawkins v.
Ireland, 64 Minn. 339, 67 N. W. 73 (1896).
'5 PomERoY, op. cit. supra note 2, § 2o91.
,Ibid.
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FRAUD-MISREPRSENTATION

OF

INTENTION

As ACTIONABLE FRAuD--De-

fendant, acting for a corporation, leased plaintiff's store and stocked it with
goods. The rent falling into arrears, defendant made numerous promises to
plaintiff that he would pay it, but failed to do so. The promises were not
intended to be kept but were made by defendant for the sole purpose of avoiding an attachment to which his goods were liable. Plaintiff, relying on these
promises, refrained from attaching defendant's goods. Defendant surreptitiously
removed his goods to a point outside the state. Held, that the statements of
intention implied in defendant's promises, being false, were actionable in deceit.
O'Gorman v. Haber, 147 Atl. 882 (R. I. I929).
While the principle that an action of fraud must be based on a representation of fact is apparently universally conceded,' the differentiation of fact from
non-fact and the basis for exceptions to the rule itself provide a field for
interesting speculation. The analysis of a promise as involving a representation
of intention (which is a present fact, and so within the principle) seems logical
enough, and yet a considerable minority of jurisdictions refuse to analyze the
promise as anything more than the representation of a matter in fi turo, therefore not actionable.' In so treating promises, of course, these jurisdictions
keep within the principle stated; their premises only are questionable. In other

fields, exceptions that are apparently based on fine moral distinctions are recognized. Thus an action will lie on a mere misrepresentation of law if defendant
has taken advantage of superior knowledge or a fiduciary relationship. Similar
exceptions apply in representations of value,' and of opinion in general. There
is, however, one exception to the general rule on "opinion statements" which
seems plausible, i. e. that value statements, when made by a vendor, are not
actionable since such statements are to be naturally distrusted and put down
as mere "dealer's talk". This result is not inconsistent with holding liable a
stranger to the transaction when he has made the statement.: In "opinion
statements" in general, however, (assuming, as has been done heretofore-and
'Church v. Sweetland, 243 Fed. 289 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Boulden v. Stilwell, ioo Md. 543, 6o Atl. 6o9 (i9o5); National Cash Register Co. v. Townsend, 137 N. C. 652, 50 S. E. 306 (igo5) ; SALmOND, THEE LAW OF TORTS (5th
ed., I92O) 5O5.

2For example, Arkansas: Harriage v. Daly, 121 Ark. 23, i8o S. W. 333
(915) ; Illinois: Miller v. Sutliffe, 241 Ill. 52I, 89 N. E. 651 (igog) ; Vermont:
Girard v. Jerry, 95 Vt. 129, 113 Atl. 533 (1921). In Montana, intention has
been analyzed as a present state of mind, but not a fact within the meaning of
the law of fraud, Emerson-Brantingham Co. v. Anderson, 58 Mont. 617, 194
Pac. 16o (I920). As representative of the majority view, see Feldman v. Witmark, 254 Mass. 480, 15o N. E. 329 (1926) ; Deyo v. Hudson, 225 N. Y. 602,
122 N. E. 635 (gig); Edgington v. Fitzmaurice, 29 Ch. D. 459 (1884).
'Jekshewitz v. Groswald, 164 N. E. 6og (Mass. 1929) ; see comment thereon
(929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 115.
'Moon v. McKinstry, 107 Mich. 668, 65 N. W. 546 (1895) ; Shumaker v.
Mather, 133 N. Y. 590, 30 N. E. 755 (1892) ; Miranovitz v. Gee, 163 Wis. 246,
157 N. W. 790 (igi6). See NoTE (1927) 13 CORN. L. Q. 140, 142.
'Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 397, 2 S. E. 713 (1887).
'Vulcan Metals Co. v. Simmons Mfg. Co., 248 Fed. 853 (C. C. A. 2d,
Igi8); Bourn v. Davis, 76 Me. 223 (1884); Deeming v. Darling, 148 Mass.

504,

N. E. io7 (1889).
Medbury v. Watson, 6 MetC. 246 (Mass. x843).
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as will be done hereafter--all the other elements of fraud), it is difficult to see
why an analysis similar to that in "promise statements" should not apply: viz.,
that the representor implies that he knows facts which justify his entertaining
the opinion.8 Such knowledge, of course, is a matter of fact and so within
the principle. To allow a defense of negligence where defendant has deliberately misled plaintiff is to depose both morals and elementary tort principle.9 Yet, though not expressed, something similar seems to be at the basis
of the cases denying liability for misrepresentations of intention, law, opinion,
and value. The exceptions based on the parties' being on an unequal footing
reveal the fallacy of the cases more clearly than the cases themselves. The
cases based on value offer an example; in the exceptional circumstances mentioned, value becomes fact, the courts say; " so, too, opinion in general." What
one strongly suspects they mean is that plaintiff has a better right to rely in
these cases.' But how can that right be questioned in anry case where defendant has set out to deceive plaintiff? A sounder result is reached in some
states by statutes which render actionable not only promises made without
intention of keeping them, but even of bona fide statements of fact made without reasonable belief of their truth."

GARNISHMENT-DELIVERY

OF CHECK By DEBTOR TO CREDITOR AS BAR TO

GARNISHMENT OF DEBT-Savings Bank delivered to depositor checks upon
X bank for the total of his deposits in Savings Bank. Depositor held these
checks for two years without attempting to collect them. Creditor then sued
depositor, garnishing deposits for which checks had been issued. Held, that
the outstanding checks constitute no defense on the part o f the garnishee.
Aleiou v. Bridgeport Savings Bank, 148 AUt. 374 (Conn. 1930).
'The reasoning of Bowen, L. J., in Smith v. Land, etc. Corp., 28 Ch. D. 7
(1884) at 15, where, however, defendant had peculiar knowledge of the facts
represented.
'But plaintiff's negligence is apparently a defence. Savage v. Stevens, 126
Mass. 207, 2o8 (1879).
See cases and Note cited supra note 4.
Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, supra note 5.
"A study of the cases suggests the thought that, in the absence of an
express intent to defraud, the determination of whether certain representations
are statements of ,fact or of opinion depends upon whether or not the person
may, under all the facts and circumstances of the case, including such person's
capacity 'or want of capacity, rely upon them." Rosenberry, J., in Maranovitz
v. Gee, supra note 4, at 255, 157 N. W. at 793. Why "in the absence of an
expresb intent to defraud" is not clear; otherwise the effect of the cases certainly seems to be as Judge Rosenberry suggests.
'2 Consider the wide area covered by the following provision: "A deceit
is either: i. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by
one who does not believe it to be true; 2. The assertion, as a fact, of that
which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be
true; 3. The suppression of a fact, by one who is bound to disclose it, or who
gives information of other facts which are likely to mislead ,for want of communication of that fact; or, 4. A promise made without any intention of performing it." 2 MONT. REv. CODES § 7575 (Choate i92I). i N. D. Comp.
LAWS ANN. (1913) § 5944 is identical.
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Since the rights of a garnisher in garnishment proceedings are based upon
the rights of the defendant as against the garnishee.' the decision in the instant
case turns upon the question as to whether the delivery of a check by a debtor
to his creditor constitutes payment of the debt. As a general rule, the check
in itself is insufficient to accomplish this result in the absence-of an agreement
that it shall,2 but the great weight of authority, as expressed in the decided
cases' and by the textwriters' supports the proposition that the mere delivery
of a check amounts to a conditional payment sufficient to protect the garnisheeY
It is submitted that a more precise statement would be that there is no payment, either absolute or conditional, until the proceeds of the check have been
collected,' .and in the meantime, the creditor, having accepted the check, is
barred from suing upon the original debt.' To require the garnishee to stop
payment might subject him to double liability,' against which danger the courts
are zealous in protecting him.' It has also been said that, having delivered the
check, he is under a duty not to stop payment' Upon dishonor the bar to suit
ATTACHMENT (7th ed. i891) § 462.
v.
Conley, 48 Ark. 267, 3 S. W. i8I (i886); Virginia-Carolina
2Henry
Chemical Co. v. McNair, i39 N. C. 326, 334, 5i S. E. 949 (io5); Little v.
Mangum, i7 F. (2d) 44 (1927).
Probably the leading case on the subject is that of Getchell v. Chase, 124
Mass. 366 (1878), though from the language of the court it would seem that
there the check had been exchanged as actual payment. However the question
had been squarely settled by the same court in Barnard v. Graves, I6 Pick. 41
(Mass. 1834). For other cases, see Prewitt v. Brown, ioi Mo. App. 254
(189o) ; Amer. Exch. Nat. Bank v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 29 Cal.
App. 8, 154 Pac. 279 (1915) ; Moreau Bank v. Japingo, 37 S. D. 404, I58 N. W.
'DRAKE,

786 (1917) ; Amer. Chemical Co. v. Scrimger, 130 Md. 389, oo Atl. 774 (1917).
'WADE, ATTAcHMENT AND GARNISHMENT (1886) § 338, 29-30; WAILES,
ATTAcH ENT AND GARNrSHMENT (2d ed. 1895) § 364; 2 MoRsE, BANKS AND
BANKING (6th ed. 1928) § 546.

'Of course the creditor may refuse the check and the debt will then be
subject to garnishment, even though the garnishee retains it and subsequently
changes his mind, Kirby Planing Mill Co. v. Titus, 14 Ga. App. I, 8o S. E. 818
(1913). Moreover, until the check has passed from the control of the garnishee
in the process of delivery to his creditor, he is under a duty to use reasonable
efforts to prevent its delivery upon notification of the garnishment proceedings,
Binkley v. Clay, Robinson, and Forest, 112 Ill. App. 332 (1904) ; Watt-HawleyHolmes Hardware Co. v. Day, I Ga. App. 646, 57 S. E. 1033 (907).

°This would seem to be the English theory, Cohen v. Dale, 3 Q. B. D. 371
(1878). See also the language in Kirby Planing Mill Co. v. Titus, supra note
5, at 4.
"See Pearce v. Davis, I Mood. & Rob. 365 (1834).
' Parker-Fain Grocery Co. v. Orr, I Ga. App. 628, 57 S. E. io74 (19o7);
Andrews v. Sasser, 17 Ga. App. 482, 87 S. E. 717 (1916).
SDRAKE, op. cit. mspra note I, § 462; Parker-Fain Grocery Co. v. Orr,
supra note 8, at 631.
"WAPLES, op. cit. supra note 3, § 364. Stoppage of payment would be in
derogation of the implied contract that the check will be honored, Prewitt v.
Brown, supra note 4. It has even been said that the debtor cannot stop payment, Watt-Harley-Holmes Hardware Co. v. Day, supra note 5, at 649. Other
cases express the proposition negatively by saying that he is under no duty to
stop payment, Parker-Fain Grocery Co. v. Orr, supra note 8, at 63o. But if,
though delivered, the debtor has regained control of the check, Dennie v. Hart,
2 Pick. 204 (Mass. 1824) ; or has paid the money into court though the check

RECENT CASES
upon the original debt is removed," but if, by the creditor's delay in presenting
the instrument for payment, a loss has accrued to the debtor, the latter is discharged in proportion to the loss." In the instant case, it would seem that the
checks were still valid and subsisting in the hands of the creditor, and though
this would lead to the logical result that the creditor could not sue upon the
original obligation, and therefore it could not be garnished, it is submitted that
a relaxing of the 16gical rule, adhering strictly to the facts of the instant case,
produces a desirable result.' The claim of the garnisher is satisfied without
rendering further proceedings necessary, and the defendant is not entitled to
protection as he has been guilty of laches in holding the instrument for two
years without cashing them. Moreover, the long standing account between the
garnishee and his creditor is settled, for since payment by the garnishee to the
garnisher would seem to be a loss caused by the delay of his creditor, this
would be a valid defense in case the latter should sue upon the original cause
of action. '

.

LESSOR AND LESSEE-EQUITABLE CONVERSION IN LEASE WITH OPTION TO
lease containing an option in the lessee to purchase the premises
provided that the lessee keep the property insured and restore the premises in
the event of fire. A fire destroyed the property and the lessee subsequently
exercised his option. Held, inter alia, that the lessee was entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. Schnee et al. v. Elston et ux, decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court January 6, ig3o.
The doctrine of equitable conversion gives the vendor of a contract for the
sale of land, as a result thereof, a so-called equitable title to the purchasemoney, and the vendee a similar equitable interest in the land, together with
all the accompanying rights thereto.' Some courts have also applied this doctrine
PURCHrASE-A

is still outstanding, Curle v. Jones, I8 Ky. 785 (1897); or if fraud is involved,
Prewitt v. Brown, supra note 4, at 260, and see comment on Dennie v. Clap, 2
Pick. 204 (Mass. 1824) in Barnard v. Graves, supra note 4, at 42; the debt is
held to be subject to garnishment. The giving of a post-dated check does not
constitute fraud, Amer. Chemical Co. v. Scrimger, supra note 4.
'Cromwell v. Lovett, I Hall 56 (N. Y. 1831); MoRsE, op. cit. supra § 544.
But presentment will be excused where the check has been lost without negligence on the part of the holder. First Nat. Bank v. McConnell, 1O3 Minn. 34p,
114 N. W. II .7 (I908).
I CONN. GEiN. STAT. (1918) § 4544 which corresponds to" UNIFORM
NEGOIABLE INSTRUMEmTS

Acr § 186. The rule was similar at common law,

Sweet v. Titus, 4 Hun. 639 (N. Y. 1875); Brown v. Schintz, 202 Ill. 509, 67
N. E. 172 (1903) ; MORSE, op. cit. supra note 3, § 546.
"This is not the theory upon which the court bases its decision. It seems
remarkable that no mention is made in the opinion of any cases decided upon
the exact point in question. The court seems to have disregarded such cases,
the great majority of which would logically have led to a different result, and
.eems to have arrived at its conclusion by stating that the check alone was not
payment and therefore the debt could be garnished. See the instant case, cited
in the text, at 376.
uSupra note 12.
ISTORY, EQuITY JuRisPRuDENcE, (I 4 th

ed. 1918) §

1092.
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to leases with an option to purchase, the conversion at the exercise of the
option relating back to the date of the giving of the option, and giving the
2
lessor an equitable title in the proceeds. For example, it has long been established in England that the next of kin of a lessor of land is entitled to the
purchase-money paid by the lessee pursuant to the exercise of his option subsequent to the lessor's death;' this rule has been followed in a few American
jurisdictions. 4 However, the more recent and more numerous American cases
have refused to follow this rule, and allow the proceeds to devolve as land.'
The English courts have strictly limited equitable conversion in option cases
to contests between the optionor's descendants; thus, pending the exercise of
the option, the lessor's heir at law receives the rents; ' the heir at law of the
deceased lessee-optionee does not have the right to exercise the option; and
the dicta of various English cases have expressed dissatisfaction with the rule
as it exists! In accordance with this tendency to limit the doctrine of equitable
conversion, the English and the majority American view in the cases where the
property is destroyed by fire prior to the exercise of the option denies the
optionee all rights in the insurance-money. But Pennsylvania, having adopted
by various dicta" the old English view" of conversion, has extended equitable
conversion to its logical conclusion by giving the lessee the benefit of the insurance, as equitable owner from the beginning;' a later Pennsylvania decision
These
also gave the optionee the proceeds of condemnation proceedings.'
decisions clearly compel the conclusion reached in the principal case. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether this principle of equitable conversion in option'See THOmSOx, REAL PROPERTY, § 4287h (1924).
8
Lawes v. Bennett, i Cox, Ch. Cas. 167 (1785); Weeding v. Weeding, I
Johns & Hem. 424 (186); Re Blake [1917] 1 Ch. I8.
"Newport Water Works v. Sisson, i8 R. I. 411, 28 AtI. 336 (1893) ; McCf. McCanna v. Hanan, 49 R. I.
24 Pa. Dist. R. 94 (913).
Cutcheon's
611 (1928).
142 Aft.Estate,
349,

"Smith v. Loewenstein, 50 Ohio St. 346, 34 N. E. 159 (1893) ; Rockland Co.
v. Leary, 203 N. Y. 469, 97 N. E. 43 (1911) ; Ingraham v. Chandler, I79 Iowa
304, 161 N. W. 434 (1917); Runke v. Bisbee, I77 Wis. 77, 187 N. W. 653
(1922). Cf. Evans v. Kingsbury, 2 Rand. 120 (Va. 1823).
lTownley v. Bedwell, i4 Ves. Jr. 59 (i8o8) ; Isaacs v. Reginall, (1894) 3
Ch. 5o6.
'Re Adams, L. R. 27 Ch. Div. 394 (1884) ; accord, Sutherland v. Parkins,
75 Ill. 338 (874); Gustin v. Union School District, 94 Mich. 502, 54 N. W.
i56 (893).
'See Townley v. Bedwell, supra note 6; Collingswood v. Row, 26 L. J. Ch.
N. S. 649 (1857) ; Isaacs v. Reginall, suapra note 6.
9
Edwards v. West, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 858 (x878); Phoenix Insurance Co.
v. Kerr,

129

Fed. 723 (C. C. A. 8th, 1904) ; Caldwell v. Frazier, 65 Kan. 24,

68 Pac. 1076 (i9o2); Gilbert v. Port, 28 Ohio St. 276 (1876); Strong v.
Moore, io5 Ore. 12, 207 Pac. 179 (i92i).
"See Kerr v. Day, 14 Pa. 112 (i85o); Longwell v. Bentley, 23 Pa. 99
(1854) ; Kelley's Estace, 6 Pa. D. & C. 770 (1916).
"Supra note 3.
' Peoples' St. Rwy. Co. v. Spencer, i56 Pa. 85, 27 Atl. 113 (1893) ; accord
on its peculiar facts, Williams v. Lilley, 67 Conn. 50, 34 Atl. 765 (i895).
'Phoenixville, Valley Forge & Stafford Ry. Co.'s Appeal, 7o Pa. Super.
391 (1918).
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leases should be extended further in those jurisdictions wherein the question
has not yet arisen, because the reason for the original rule of equitable conversion, i. e., a binding contract for the conveyance of land, is clearly not
present in the case of an option, and because along with the fiction of conversion
the fiction of "relating back" must be employed."

MARRIAGE BROKERAGE CoNTRAcrs-ILLEGAIETY-PuBLIc PoLicy-The plaintiff sued the defendant on the latter's promise to pay him $5oo. to procure a husband for the defendant's daughter. Held, that a marriage brokerage contract is
contrary to public policy and will not be enforced. Packerman v. Shuster, 12 Pa.
D. & C. 718 (1929).

Marriage brokerage has been defined as "the act by which a person interferes, for a consideration to be received by him, between a man and a woman, for
the purpose of promoting a marriage between them."' Agreements to pay for
such service, whether made by one of the parties to the intended marriage or a
third party,' have uniformly been held void as contrary to public policy, both at
law and in equity,' whether the contract was to obtain a particular person as
spouse ' or any person acceptable to the other party 5 The reason for the attitude
of the courts toward any contract for the payment of money in return for the
procurement of a marriage, although marriage itself is encouraged by the law, is
the realization that marriage is a relationship so important to the welfare of the
state and of the parties involved that, more than all others, it should be entered
upon only with the free and unfettered consent of both parties. Anything which
tends to destroy this unfettered consent is against public policy and it is hard to
see how anything could be more likely to have such a result than the introduction of the sordid motives and pernicious influence of the marriage broker intent
on earning his fee, whatever the method or the effect.' The fact that in a particular instance the broker is acting in good faith and the union is a happy one
will not avail to make such a contract valid.' On the ground that a marriage

'See

LANGDELL, EQUITY JURISDICTION, (2d ed.

1908)

272.

'Helen v. Anderson, 83 Ill. App. 5o6 (1898).
IMorrison v. Rogers, 115 Cal. 252, 46 Pac. IOT2 (1896); Wenninger v.

Mitchell, 139 Mo. App. 420, 122 S. W. 1130 (1909).

3
Overman v. Clemmons, i9 N. C. 185 (1836); Hermann v. Charlesworth,
2 K. B. 123 (i9o5). The courts have extended this rule to include almost any
aid in securing a marriage, for remuneration. Jangraw v. Perkins, 76 Vt. 127,
56 Atl. 532 (1903) (contract to hasten an intended marriage); Morrison v.

Rogers, supra note

2

(contract to procure a person to keep a promise of mar-

riage already made); King. v. Burr, 3 Mer. 693 (Eng. r8io) (contract to pay
for entertainment given by the plaintiff, with a view to the defendant's marriage).
'Crawford v. Russel, 62 Barb. 92 (N. Y. 1856).
"Hermann v. Charlesworth, supra note 3.
'This reasoning applies only to countries where the common law system of
jurisprudence exists, for in the Roman Law, marriage brokerage contracts were
valid. WALD, POL.ACK ON CONTRACTS (3d ed.)

19o6.

v. Dame, x8 Pick. 472 (Mass. 1836). Following the general rule as
to contracts against public policy, Teal v. Walker, IIi U. S. 242, 4 Sup. Ct. 42o
(884).
7Fuller
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brokerage contract is not only illegal and void, but also fraudulent in character
and that the party paying must be regarded as under a species of undue influence,
many courts have held that even where the contract has been fully executed on
both sides, the consideration paid to the broker could be recovered 8 The universality of the rule against marriage brokerage contracts, and the extent to
which it has been carried, show the strength of the feeling that such contracts
are seriously injurious to the public welfare. Nor is there apparent any tendency
toward relaxation of the rule.'
a Duval v. Wellman, 124 N. Y. 156, 26 N. E. 343 (i8gi) ; Wenninger v. Mitchell, supM note 2. Contra: White v. Equitable Nuptial Union, 76 Ala. 251, 52
Am. Rep. 325 (1884), semble on the ground that the court will not aid either
party to a contract illegal as against public policy.
'A recent case where a marriage brokerage contract was declared invalid is
Hurwitz v. Taylor (1926) So. Afr. L. R. 81, reported in (1927) 27 COL. LAW
REV. 322.

